the way we experience the world is already reflected in that world. The world we humans live in is what we have shaped, rather like the way a sculptor shapes a form out of stone. What Heidegger called “worlding” is a mediation of ourselves and what is not ourselves, the former driven it seems from the start to dominate, ignore or presume we are have a privilege position outside what we are always already within.
Heidegger was one of the few early philosophers to have discussed the effects of technology. He feared that technology will start affecting existence and shall be viewed as the “the era’s metaphysics.” He delved into its complexities and dangers. In his lecture “The Question Concerning Technology,” he noted that “questioning is piety of thought.” He believed in the essence behind the world of technology, which man cannot fully control. Man thus becomes captive to technology and is driven by its own impulses and tools.
In Phenomenological Reviews Zühtücan Soysal reviews Jean-Luc Nancy's The Banality of Heidegger.
for Heidegger, the horror of Nazism is not related to a moral, political, or sociological account of the extermination camps but has always been “the extreme destinal point of technics” and machination. For this matter, the Nazi regime, for Heidegger, indulged in the ultimate German hypocrisy, as it were, by taking as its principle the domination of the masses despite the Greek legacy of authentic thought. It is ontically the closest to the possibility of the second beginning, that is, by being German, yet ontologically maybe the farthest.
I remember quite vividly while writing my dissertation reading Heidegger on Hoederlin where he had said Hoederlin's conception of nature as sacred was the closest anyone other than Schelling had come to an understanding of Beyng.
This way of being—always already living ahead in the end-for-which
as returning-to and disclosing—is an original, unified, fundamental
comportment whose structure expresses the “as.” The “as” has the function
of uncovering something in terms of something, of uncover something
as—i.e., as this or that. The “as” is the structure of understanding.
The understood is a ἑρμηνεία, that-which-is-understood in an understanding.
We said that understanding is a basic comportment of existence.
Therefore, the structure of the “as” is the fundamental hermeneutical
structure of the being of that being which we call existence
(human life). This fundamental hermeneutical structure can be apprehended
in a relatively (and I emphasize relatively) original form of what
we called “direct dealing-with-something.”
Only insofar as this capacity to understand—to make sense of—already
belongs to existence, can existence express itself in sounds, such
that these vocal sounds are words that now have meaning. Because
existence, in its very being, is sense-making, it lives in meanings and
can express itself in and as meanings. Only because there are such
vocal sounds (i.e., words) that accrue to meanings, can there be individual
words, i.e., the linguistic forms that are stamped by
meaning and can be detached from that meaning. We call such a
whole of sounds in which existence’s capacity to understand has
somehow evolved and become existential, language; and when I speak
here of a whole of existence I do not mean an individual act of existence,
but being-with-each-other qua historical.
Greengrass is a philosopher – those short stories of hers were generally about asking questions, avoiding subjects. What it was to be-in-the-world, as Heidegger might have had it, to apprehend reality through narrative and perspective.