In 1971, I wrote my PhD dissertation on a comparative study of Mawlana (Rumi) and Meister Eckhart. Karl Löwith was my supervisor. I found out there is actually similarities between western philosophers and Muslim mystics (Sufis)—that the comparisons are not without merit. I published it under the title of Historical Sociology. In this book, I showed that Mawlana, Eckhart and Heidegger’s ideas are not philosophical but mystical. Gadamer read my works and told me that I was right, he told me that “for the last thirty years, I’ve been saying that my dear teacher, Heidegger, is a mystic, but no one believes me. You are the first one that has written this down.” It is surprising that Mr. Ayatollahi, Davari Ardakani and Dinani also believed this and they told me once that Heidegger’s being a mystic is the reason that they agree with his ideas. I told them that because I believe that Heidegger is a mystic, I am rejecting and criticizing him; because Heidegger is deviating from the rational German philosophy.
The philosopher Heidegger believed that impending death is an essential feature of human existence. “Heidegger saw death as a pervasive feature of your being in the world and not just an unfortunate event that happens at the very end,” says [Taylor] Carman. “He thought we can’t really understand ourselves unless we see ourselves as finite.” After all, “If my time is finite, what’s important and how do we live?”
Heidegger and Bentham had different notions of honesty around death. While Heidegger believed that anxiety about death was inevitable in life, Bentham’s point was to “demystify our mortality and finitude and render it tractable,” says Carman. Both, though, were considerably more honest about death than most. And this honesty makes life all the more meaningful.
[P]hilosophers from Socrates onwards have been in the business of questioning accepted communal pieties, often at their own peril. One lineage beginning with Plato has thus seen philosophers repeatedly attracted to forms of tyrannical government. For in these regimes, their controversial wisdom can directly shape policy, by-passing any need to court popular consent. The most influential 20th century figure in this lineage of ‘Platonic political philosophy’ is Alexander Dugin’s philosophical hero, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger....
“A different, special, exclusive place in the history of philosophy that can be set aside for Heidegger should be recognized,” Dugin has proclaimed: "in the case that we fully trust Heidegger, immerse ourselves in his thinking, and make him our highest authority, … even in the event that his deeds went beyond the accepted norms of common morals. Geniuses are forgiven by everyone."...
Heidegger’s Germanism might then seem to pose a sizeable problem for a Russian ethno-nationalist like Dugin. But the latter’s fidelity to Heidegger sees him proposing to carry the German thinker’s anti-modernist project forwards, by relocating it on different “Indo-European”, Slavic or Russian soil. For Dugin, the “putrefaction” of the West diagnosed by Heidegger meant that Nazism could not break out from modernity. One needed to look further East: to the untapped telluric riches of the Russian narodi (very roughly, “people”) and its language.
With the phrase "Je est un autre" Rimbaud anticipated the unconcious as being an essential part of the subject. Moreover, Rimbaud's "I', in the transitional poetry between Romanticism and Modernism, to which Rimbaud's statement should be seen as belonging, is not only a questioning of a stable, indivisible subject, that is, the unity of the subject with itself, the subject's, but also a breaking up of the lyrical subject and the Cartesian self-identity of the "I" of poetry. Indeed, what Rimbaud can be said to precursor is the free play of Modernism and even more so of Postmodernism.
Heidegger first asks about how rhythmos relates to the incompatible terms nearness and the unapproachable, which, according to the Greek poet Archilochos, is supposed to keep the human being in line. Second, he asks if poetry still has the force to save language from the Gestell of modern science as represented by the sciences of language, linguistics, and informatics. Third, Heidegger answers these questions by answering that Rimbaud remains vital to poetry if poets keep asking these questions in their poetry, which means becoming a seer that can hear the call of the unknown. For poets to be able to do this they must find a way to make the unknown still, the rhythm of poetry must still the unknown.
P. 138From James M. Magrini and Elias Schwieler's Heidegger on Literature, Poetry, and Education after the “Turn”: At the Limits of Metaphysics.
The statements of Derrida and Heidegger might have the appearance of complimenting non-Western philosophy for avoiding the entanglements of Western metaphysics. In actuality, their comments are as condescending as talk of ‘noble savages’, who are untainted by the corrupting influences of the West, but are for that very reason barred from participation in higher culture.
In the end, Jim neither flees nor fights, refusing the "anxious" retreat and escape from his destiny, and refuses to fight as if recognizing the uselessness of mere human machinations in acts of doing violence through the power of techne. Rather, he understands what is required is a "self-opening or a stance of receptivity that relates to beings by looking beyond them," to their "source and ground in concealment and mystery". In direct relation to the understanding of Heidegger's poetizing of the ταμηχανα, against which no one can avail themselves, Jim releases himself over to an approaching destiny, realizing there is "no escape" and "nothing to fight for," and so he solemnly with the "hearty' knowledge of Being (as φρην), declares, "Time to finish this". It is not Jim's death per se that is of supreme interest but, rather, der Augenblick, the 'right time." or time of Being's historical presencing and appropriation (Ereignis), when Jim takes up the δεινον prior to ever standing before Doramin and uttering his final words, "I am come ready and unarmed". In this moment (der Augenblick) Jim becomes because he already is, what is poetized, the story, the telling, the saying (muthos), namely, the supreme unhomely One (to deinotaton), which for Heidegger indicates that he is "nothing other than becoming homely in being unhomely," and in the poetic telling, it must be understood, and this is what sets the telling of from a saying associated with works of "free inventing [Erfinden] in the sense of will imagining by authors and poets, that the telling "always remains only as a potential for being that pertains to risk--as something to be poetized and poetically decidable".
P. 174From James M. Magrini and Elias Schwieler's Heidegger on Literature, Poetry, and Education after the “Turn”: At the Limits of Metaphysics.