enowning
Friday, September 22, 2017
 
In-der-Blog-sein

Larval Subjects received an uncanny thing.
Well the appearance of this thing in my world is an experience like that broken tool.  Yet phenomenologically it’s different.  It’s the appearance of something uncanny.  Like the broken tool, it has the effect of mildly decomposing a world and bringing that network into relief or visibility.  Yet unlike the broken tool, it seems to speak to alterity as something that perpetually haunts worldhood.  Something can always strike from without.  This strange thing appeared in my world from nowhere, challenging the meaningfulness of that world.
 
Thursday, September 21, 2017
 
The Guardian on the Gucci show in Milan.
Heidegger’s thoughts on authenticity, Camus’ writings on the nature of rebellion, 17th-century cartography and the stage wear of Elton John – the catwalk show that opened Milan fashion week did not follow a formula smacking of obvious commercial success. But this is Gucci, where the designer Alessandro Michele’s avant-garde approach to luxury has confounded the industry.
 
Wednesday, September 20, 2017
 
In-der-Blog-sein

Infrapolitical Deconstruction has a note on Slavoj Zizek’s “The Persistence of Ontological Difference.”
But do we not have, again, a tendency to see the ontological difference too much on the side of onto-theology? Being is not another name for the God of theology, not for Heidegger. Whence the insistence? Yes, reality is not all for the human, Dasein cannot experience it in any kind of completeness (which is not structurally the case for the Hegelian Subject of Absolute Knowledge, by the way). But the ontological difference does not posit an illusion coming to compensate for subjective deficiencies! Zizek is still within an understanding of ontological difference in the Hegelian sense of the difference between beings and the being of beings. But Heidegger, at a minimum, points elsewhere: towards another difference, and a more decisive one from the point of view of rupturing metaphysics, the difference between being and the being of beings.
 
Friday, September 15, 2017
 
On AuBC, artist Noëmi Lakmaier on Cherophobia.
Lakmaier's art is underpinned by existential philosophy and the construct of control. In an interview about Cherophobia, she refers to German philosopher Martin Heidegger and his masterwork Being and Time. "[Heidegger] talks about the everyday as this kind of mode that we operate, in which we forget who we are," she says. "He talks about it as a necessity of being a human, but that occasionally we need experiences that are not the everyday. He calls these 'moments of vision', and they enable us to continue being human and to grow. Maybe that's a bit grandiose, but I hope that maybe there might be a small moment of vision for people. Something that's very different [to their everyday]."
 
Thursday, September 14, 2017
 
In Haaretz, Heidegger in Israel.
[I]f we seek biblical parallels, perhaps we can think of another way of contending with the thought of the anti-Semitic philosopher: to behave like the Israelites, who, according to Exodus 3:22, fled from Egypt with the Egyptians’ gold and silver vessels. Christian theologian Augustine saw the commandment to the Israelites to steal Egypt’s treasures as an allegory for the permission granted to him and his ilk to appropriate the Greeks’ philosophical treasures, without adopting their idol worship. But in the same way, anti-fascist philosophers in the 20th century, as well as many Jewish philosophers, permitted themselves to appropriate basic ideas from the Nazi Heidegger’s philosophy – even if they totally rejected his political worldview.
 
 
In NDPR, Eric S. Nelson reviews Kwok-Ying Lau's Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding: Toward a New Cultural Flesh.
Heidegger openly engaged with Daoist and Buddhist thinkers and sources throughout his career. Nonetheless, we find a series of hesitations about whether such encounters can be decisive and even possible, as Heidegger set the Occidental and Oriental, the morning and evening lands, into opposition, projected the encounter between East and West into a future that can only be anticipated and never enacted. He also reemphasized the necessity -- from his first formulation of the "first and other beginning" (der erste und der andere Anfang) in the early 1930s through his Spiegel Interview in 1966 -- of an Occidental encounter and confrontation with its own origins in order to initiate a new or other beginning. Or, to mention another revealing case, even while Emmanuel Levinas critiqued the priority of the self and the home in previous Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology for the sake of the other person and the neighbor, and opened up the differences and tensions between the ontological (Athens) and the ethical (Jerusalem) in interrogating the reign of identity and totality in Western philosophy, he could at points dismiss non-Western thinking as mere dancing, pagan idolatry, and faddish exoticism.
 
Wednesday, September 13, 2017
 
In LARB, Jon Baskin reviews Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft’s Thinking in Public.
Levinas did not write as much about ancient philosophy as either Strauss or Arendt, but in a passage from his 1961 essay, “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us,” quoted by Wurgaft, he evokes Socrates as the figure of a philosopher who, in contrast to Heidegger, “exemplified an interest in the experiences of others in all their uniqueness.” It is telling, says Levinas, that whereas Heidegger preferred “the countryside and trees,” Socrates preferred “the town, in which one meets people”: his dialogues with fellow-citizens represent the intellectual not only as a thinker but also as an ethical actor who in his public speech both acknowledges and takes responsibility for the flourishing of the “other.” Levinas thus proposes, in place of Western humanism, a secularized version of a universalistic religious ethic, according to which the “mere human” has intrinsic value. If Heidegger’s philosophy suggested that our responsibility could be limited by geographical or temporal communities, Levinas argued that “the very infinitude of the other person that we see in his face is, effectively, ‘the first word: you shall not commit murder.’”
 
Tuesday, September 12, 2017
 
Heidegger, 'World-Judaism', and Modernity by Peter Trawny, September 17, 2014
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

View mobile version